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ABSTRACT
Under the assumption of constant returns toscale, there is
a very simple, easily testable condition for optimal investment
under uncertainty. Application of the testrequires no
parametric assumptions about technology and noassumptions
about the competitiveness of the output market.The condition
is that the expected marginal revenueproduct of labor equal
the expected rental price of capital. The conditionimplies a
certain invariance property for a modified versionof Solow's
productivity residual. Tests of the invarianceproperty for
U.S. industry data give very strong rejection inquite a few
industries. The interpretation of rejection iseither that the
technology has increasing returns (possibly because of fixed






SinceDale Jorgenson's (1963)pioneering work, Investment theory has
been embedded in the theory of theoptimizing firm. The firm acquires
capital as part of a plan to produce output and purchaseInputs so as to
maximize the present discounted value of the firm.However, both
Jorgenson and most of his succesors derived structural investment
functions. Jorgenson's derivationwas rot explicitly stochastic and more
recent work has been able to obtain closed-form investmentequations only
by making very strong assumptions. Thepurpose of this paper is to
isolate the essential condition foroptimal investment in an explicit
framework of stochastic optimization. The conditionIs readily testable
without parametric assumptions about thetechrology; the second half of
the paper carries out simple tests with dataon U.S. industries. I make
no attempt to derive or estimate a structural investmentequation. The
test applied here should precede thedevelopment of an investment
equation—only after a test of the type derived here can be passed should
the researchgo on to the further step of estimating an investment
equation.
The condition I examine is that themarginal revenue product of
capital--the increase in revenue associated with an incremental unit of
capital--be equated in expectation to the service or rentalprice of capital.
The relevant expectation is one formed ator before the time that capital
can be varied.
The reader may note the parallel in theobjectives of this restatement
of investment theory withmy earlier work on consumption, Hall (1978).
IFor consumption, I derived a simple first-order corxhtlon that deals with
the most central Issue in consumption, the reaction of a consumer to new
information about irxome. The first-order condition or Euler equation is
readily testable. However, it is not a full statementof all the conditions
for optimal consumption behavior and It does not yield a consumption
fu-iction in closed form. Similarly, the condition derived here for optimal
investment--the equality of the expected marginal revenue product of
capital to the rental price of capital--does not result in aclosed-form
investment furxtion under general conditions.
By setting a theory of investment within a formalstochastic
model of the firm, It is possible to deal rigorously with the potentially
important role of Jensen's inequality. For technologiesin which the
amoint of capital determines the physical capacity to produce output, one
would anticipate that the level of capacity would bear some relation to the
expected level of output. However, as De Vany aix! Frey (1982)have
noted, a firm may choose to invest in capacity which is frequently
unutilized. But a firm in that situation should still equate the expected
marginal revenue product of capital to Its expected serice cost.
The decision I examine here is the choice of capital stock as part of a
general strategy that determines the level of output aswell. The
firm Is viewed as maximizing expected profit given the probability
distribution for future product demand. The optimal capital stock has a
very simple property:The average value of the marginal revenue product
of capital over a span of years should equal the average value of the rental
price of capital.
2The role of the assumption & constwit retirnsto scale
The basic idea of thispaper Is that, trxier constant returns to scale, the
actual value of the marginal reverijeproduct of capital, ex post, can be
computed as the residual profit per zlt of capital. No further
assumptions about tecFrxlogy are needed. The only other critical element
of the computation is the removal fromprofit of the component generated
by the market power of the firm.
The hypothesis of constant returns to scaleIs no novelty in this area--
past researth on investment has explicitly or Implicitly adopted the
hypothesis in most cases. Any model that concludes Ina accelerator
relation--proportionality between output aM capital—rests on constant
returns. Moreover, constant returns provides the easiestargument to
stçport aggregation from the firm to the industry. The theory of
investment irxfer Increasing returns,especially the type of increasing
returns associated with fixed costs, Involves rather differentelements
from those generally considered in Investmenttheory.
The hypothesis tested In thispaper is the joint hypothesis of constant
returns aixi optimal choice of capital stock. The methodemployed does not
permit the separation of the two parts of the joint hypothesis, because the
use of residual profit to measure the realized value of themarginal
revenue product of capital requires constant returns. Thestrong rejection
of the joint hypothesis means either that thetechnology has increasing
returns or that firms over-accumulate capital, or both.
My own view Is that both explanations are Important. Thejoint
hypothesis is rejected because firms have too little profit tosquare with
the evidence about their marketpower. The question is, what ecormicprocess dissipatesthe latent profit from market power? I think part of
the answer Is that there are fixed costs of labor, capital, advertising,and
other factors naeded to enter many markets. The other part ofthe answer
is that market power attracts entry to the point wherethe capital stock Is
excessive, when judged by the comparison of the expected marginal
revenue product to the rental price of capital. However,the method of this
paper canrxt separatethe two.
Thestrategy
Thepaper proceeds inthe following way: It characterizes the optimal
capital of an optimizing firm (possiblywith market power) under the
assumption of constant returns to scale. Optimalityinvolves the expected
equelity of the marginal revenue productof capital to the rental price of
capital. The realized marginal revenue productand the rental price of
capital will differ by an unpredictable errorwith mean zero, under
optimal Investment.
The condition just stated makes rc assumption ona way or theother
about competition or market power. Under competition, therealized
marginal product of capital could bemeasured directly as the realized rate
of profit. In the presere of market power, the measurementof the
marginal revenue product of capital Istrickier. Measured profit contains
an element which is chronically positive,the earnings from the typical
firm's morxpoly position. In addition, profit will containthe stochastic
element with mean zero predicted by investment theory.In order to
4isolate the latter element, it isnecessary to remove the monopoly
element by valuing output atmarginal cost rather than price.
If marginal cost were observeddirectly, then the calculations of
this paper would beelementary. I wouldcalculate the realized marginal
reverue product of capitalas thedifference between output valued at
marginal cost and actual lrçut costs other than capital. Then I would
compare the realized marginal reverue product to the service price of
capital as perceived earlier when the Investment decision relevant for
thIs year was made. If the realizedprofit rate was generally lower, I
would reject the joint hypothesis of constant returns andoptimal
investment.
Only a noisy measure of marginal cost is available directly from the
data. My earlier work on the relation betweenprice and marginal cost
derived a measure of marginal cost basedon changes in cost that occur
from year to year as output changes. Theapproach I use in this paper
implicitly makes use of the noisy direct measure of marginal cost. I
show that the result of combining thehypothesis of optimal capital
accumulation with my earlier method formeasuring marginal cost can be
expressed as an Invariance condition for a certain measure ofproductivity
growth. Measured productivity will be u±anged in the face ofa shift
which alters the levels of employment andoutput, provided that the shift
has no effect on true productivity growth. In thepresence of nonoptimal
investment or increasing returns, on the other hand, measured
productivity will not be invariant. Thus the relation between measured
productivity growth and exogenous instrumental variablescan formthe
basis for a test of the joint hypothesis.
My earlier work on testing the equality of price and marginal cost alsoderived an invarianoe result for productivity. I made use of the
prirxiple that Solow's productivity residual is invariant uxier exogenot
shifts, provided that markets are competitive and the tecfr1ogy has
constant rettrrs to scale. The productivity measure used here is
different; it does not consider the output price and its invarlanoe does not
depend on competition.
Relation to previous work on stochastic investmenttheory
Thebest-known exposition of investment theory uxier uxertainy is
Lucas and Prescott (1971). A related development appears more recently
in Abel and Blanohard (1986). Lucas and Prescott state the first order
condition for optimal investment as the requirement that the discoL.rlted
expected contribution of capital to next period's value of the firm be equal
to the current cost of acquirir capital. As they note, this simplifies the
problem from the point of view of the firm, but requires a full analysis of
the determination of the value of the firm in general equilibrium. Abel
and Blanohard express the first-order condition in the form that the
present discotnted value of the marginal contribution of current investment
to all futi.re profits be equal to the acquisition cost of capital. In other
words, Abel and Blanohard sthstitute a simple theory of the value of the
firm into Lucas and Prescott's condition.
Both Lucas-Prescott and Abel-Blarxhard, and all writers In the less
formal "qtheor>/' tradition, assure that there are adjustment costs in the
investment process. By contrast, my own development adopts the "time to
build" framework as in Kydlarxi and Prescott (1982). An earlier paper of
6mine (Hall (1977)) explores the relation between the twoapproaches and
notes their equivalence, in the following sense: Urthr the time-to-build
constraint, there will be an exact relation between the value of the firm
and the rate of Investment of thetype derivable from adjustment costs.
My earlier paper also s&ws in detail that the first-order condition
relating the acquisition cost of capital to the present d1scotnted value of
the marginal rever.ie product ofcapital, as in Abel-Blanchard, is exactly
equivalent to the first-order condition relating the rentalprice of capital
to the current marginal revenue product of capital,as In this paper. In
essence, the latter can be obtained by taking appropriate differences over
time in the former. There is no conflict between thepre-Jorgenson view
of investment which looks atpresent disconted values of the profit flows
from an investment and Jorgenson's Idea ofrelating the current profit
contribution to the current rental price of capital.
In the usual specification of adjustmentcosts, it is not true that the
expected marginal revenue product of capital Is equated to the expected
rental price of capital, when theexpectation is formed some finite period
before the two variables are realized. There is anotherterm, the shadow
price of adjustment. However, that term Is positive half the time and
negative the other half of the time. Hence the proposition Investigated
here, which asserts that the averagegap between the marginal revenue
product and the rental price is zero, 1c1ds uxier the adjustment cost
specification as well as uider the time-to-build specification.
I conclude that all formal models of Investmentare based on equivalent
notions about the basic first order condition for optimal investment. The
hypothesis tested here—expected equality of marginal revenue product and
rental price of capital—Is essentially a irilversal statement ofoptimality,
7provided that the expectation is evaluated over a long time perspective.
1.Theory
A firm uses capital K and labor N to produce output Q.Itsproduction
firction is:
(1.1) Q= Ft(N,K)
The technology hasconstant returns toscale, so Ft is homogeneousof
degreeone inN andK.
The firm is uncertain about future demand and future factor prices,
which are influenced by a random variable q. Its revenue function is
R (Q'i)• The firm picks an employment strategy Nt (q,.
. . ,rQand a
investment strategy contingent on the observed realizations
of ri. Note that employment can respond to the most recent information
but there is a lag, r, in the response of capacity to new information; r is
the time to build.
The objective of an investment strategy is to maximize the expected
discounted value of profit:
(1.2) Max E { D [R(Ft(N,Kt),rl) -wtNt
-rtK] }
HereDt is the discount function, w is the wage, and rt is the service or
rental price of capital. The expectation is conditional upon all
Binformation known to the firm at the time itpicks the strategy. A fully
optimal strategy will be time-consistent--it will maximize theremaining
future expected discouted profitas of any time period. TF, it is rt
necessary to consider the conditional expectations midway through the
process.
Under perfect competition and constantreturns, it is well known that
the investment and employmentstrategies of the firm have a knife-edge
character. If the expected futureprice exceeds long-ru marginal cost,
investment and employment will be infinite, whereas ifprice is expected
to fall sixrt of that level, zerocapital and zero labor will be used. At the
point of equality, the scale of the firm is indeterminate. Thispaper
considers primarily the case where each firm has marketpower, which is
sufficient to eliminate the knife-edgeproblem. The basic condition--
equality of expected marginal revenue product and rentalprice of capital--
applies to the competitive case as well, but I will not burden the reader
with an analyticalapparatus that irciudes that special case.





themarginal revenue product of capital. Then the first-order condition
for optimal investment is
(1.4) E(zt-rt) =0
9The expectation is conditional on the same information available to the
firm when it cfxioses its strategy.Thebasic message of this condition is
simple: AninvestigatorwF calculates the excess of the marginal revenue
product of capital over the service price of capital, after the fact, will
find that its average value is zero. If its average value is consistently
negative, the firm is txlding too much capital to be consistent with profit
maximization.
One could find more elaborate characterizations of optimal investment
strategies. For example, the expectation of z- rt conditional on
information available in year t- tstxuld also be zero. However, the
results obtained here rejecting even the simplest characterization are so
strong that there is no good reason to examine other characterizatiors.
The advantage of my procedure is expressed in the following
Proposition .1 (Irrelevance of time to build).
For any value of t, E(z -r)
=0for all periods in which output is
produced.
Th, the trothlesome issue of lags in the investment process can be
sidestepped by looking only at the average of the marginal revenue product
of capital and rot its correlation with other variables.
The basic condition examined here requires that the expected marginal
revenue product of capital less the rental price of capital, r, equal
zero. Equivalently, the actual value of the same variable should differ
10from zero by an error, E,withmean zero:
(1.5) zt-rt=
Et
invarianceof the cost-based productivityresickial
My earlier work--Hall (1987)--derived a method for testing theequality
of price and marginal cost from changes in cost andcorresponding
changes in output. The essential idea is expressed in the following
proposition: Under competition, with price equal to marginal cost, the
Solow productivity residual Is invariant uderchanges in output and
employment induced by some outside force that affects product demandor
factor supply. On the other hand, with marketpower and a gap between
price and marginal cost, the Solow residual will rise whenever an outside
force raises output. The logic is simple: The Solow residualuses the
ratio of compensation to the value ofoutput to infer the elasticity of output
with respect to employment. When theprice is distorted upward by
market power, the estimate of the elasticity is too low.Hence, the
adjustment In the Solow residual for the change in employment is too
small and the residual rises whenever employment andoutput rise in
response to an outside stimulus.
This paper derives and uses a similar, butquite distinct invariance
result. The reason that the Solow productivitymeaswe fails in the
presence of market power is its use of total revenue in the denominator of
the estimate of the elasticity ofoutput with respect to input. An
11alternative estimate of the elasticity is the ratio of labor compensation to
total cost, where the latter is the sum of compensation and the service
cost of capital, rK. I will demonstrate that the productivity residual
calculated using this estimate of the elasticity retains the invariance
property in the presence of market power. That is, measured productivity
should not rise when an outside force raises output, provided that the
productivity measure uses the cost-based elasticity.
The empirical results will show that most industries do not satisfy the
invariance condition for the cost-based productivity measure. I show that
the failure of the invariance condition could arise from excess capacity or
from increasing returns to scale. Basically the cost-based productivity
residual rises when output rises in response to an exogenous force because
the cost-based elasticity is hardly larger than the revenue-based elasticity.
Although most of the industries seem to be made up of firms with
considerable market power, they are not exceptionally profitable. Their
revenue is only modestly in excess of their costs, including the full
service cost of capital. Hence the behavior of the cost-based residual is
hardly different from the Solow residual; it rises whenever an exogenous
force increases output.
The conclusion Is that there is not nearly enough profit to make the
amoiiit of market power inferred from the behavior of the Solow residual
consistent with constant returns to scale and optimal capacity. The
question is what is absorbing the latent profit generated by the market
power. One of the answers could be excess capacity. Entry stimulated by
the profits associated with market power proceeds to the point that firms
are all operating well below capacity. The other answer is fixed costs.
Fixed costs are a failure of constant retixns to scale and could also
12empirical findings.
The easiestway to see the major difference between the invariarxe
condition tested In thispaper and the or tested in my earlier paper Is that
the output price has a central role in the Solow residual, wfrseInvariance
tests the equality of price and marginal cost. On the other hand, the
output price does not even appear In the calculation of the cost-based
residual. Only the behavior of inputs,output, and costs determine the
movements of the cost-based residual. Hence the cost-based residual Is
appropriate for testing the joint hypothesis of optimal investment and
constant returns, both of which involve the technology and the cfice of
Inputs, but not conditions in the output market.
Derivation &the invarionce ccnditian
Thebasic relation derived inmy earlier paper can be written as
(1.6)Aq = in + 9
= on + 0
Here Aq Is the rate of growth of the output/capitalratio, n is the rate
of growth of the labor/capital ratio, 0 is the rate of Hicks-neutral
technical progress, and o Is the share of labor cost, wN, in totalcost,
mQ. The relevant concept of cost is marginal cost,m, times total output,
Q.Underconstant returns, total cost mQ is just the sn of labor cost,
wN, and capital cost, (r+E)K.Becausethe latter is Lrobservable, the
there o i eleo *robeervable. Equation 1.6 le exactly tF corc1uionof
13Solow's (1957) derivation of total factor productivity growth, except that
ha asswned the equality of price and marginal cost and so put p in place of
m in the derxminator of the labor share.
It is a simple matter to calculate a closely related observed share,
y*whichIs labor's share In cost when the cost of capital is evaluated ex
are rather than ex post. That is,
, * —wN —rK+wN
The two shares differ becae of the surprise difference between tha
anticipated cost of capital, rK, and the realized shadow cost of capital,
(r+E)K.
Iwill be corr.eriied with what Icallthe cost-basedproductivity
residual,
(1.8) Aqa*An
If this residual could be calculated with u in place of cr, it would obey an
invariance property of the type exploited in my earlier paper. However, a
little algebra sfxws that the cost-based residual has a second term
involving the surprise, e:
(1.9)Aqa*An=9 - (1cr*)An€
Ina strong year, employment growth An will be positive andwillbe
positive as well--capital's shadow value will exceed its rental price.
Hence the second term will be negative. In a weak year, both An and E
14will be negative, and the secorxf term will benegative again. Herxe, the
cost-based residual uderstates productivitygrowth.
The same property that makes the cost-based resdua1a poor meastre
of productivity growth provides the basis for agood test of the joint
hypothesis of optimal investment and constant returns. Consider an
instrumental variable, say x, that has a stror causal effecton output, but
is t.norrelated with productivity growth, e.TheInstrument is stn'e to
be positively correlated with E as well as with n, but Its correlation with
the composite disturbance (1cr*) cn E/r will be close tozero. The
composite disturbance is generally positive in both good and bad times,
whereas the instrument is positive in good times andnegative in bad
times. The correlation will be essentially zero. This establishes
Proposlticn 2(invariance&the cost-based resithial): Underthe joint
hypothesis of optimal investment and constant returns to scale, the cost-
based residual is trcorrelated with an instrumental variable that Is
uncorrelated with the rate of productivity growth.
The cost-based productivity residual is similar to theone proposed by
Solow (1957). However, Solow used labor's share in in totalrevenue,
a =wN/pQ,as an estimate of the elasticity of' output with respect to
labor Irçut, whereas this measure uses labor's share Incost, o. For a
firm with significant pure profit derived from marketpower, a is
considerably smaller than cy*. Solow's original form of the residual was
the basis for the measurement of marketpower In my earlier work.
Equation 1.9 says that the residual based instead on the cost share can
test the joint hypothesis of constant retums and optimal investment. A
15firm with procyclical Solow productivity has marketpower. Under
constant returns and optimal Investment, the Solow residual but rt the
cost-based residual will be procyclical. When the productivity measure
based on the cost share Is also procyclical, the joint hypothesis is
refuted. To put it a differentway, the switch from the revenue share, a,
to the cost share, cr*, would eliminate the cycle in productivity for a firm
possessing market power with constant returns arid optimal investment.
A firm with market power and increasing returns or excesscapacity
would have procyclical productivity by both measures. In this discts1on,
procyclical means that when an exogenos force raises the firm's output,
measured productivity rises as well.
Excess capacity
Nowconsider a firm that systematically over-invests. Its realized
marginal revenue product of capital will generally be lower than the rental
price of capital. The deviation, E,willm longer be a pure surprise; it
will have a negative mean. As a result of the negativemean, the
composite disturbance in equation 1.9, -(jo*) aM€/r, will be less
negative in good times arid more negative in bad times; it will be
positively correlated with an Instrument. This argument establishes
Proposition 3(effectof excess capacity):Fora firm with systematic
overlrivestment rather than optimal investment, the cost-based residual
will be positively correlated with an instrument, when that Instrument is
itself positively correlated with the firm's output.
16According to the proposition, one of the possible interpretations of the
finding that the cost-based residual Is positively correlated withan
instrument is that the firm or inckstrygenerallyholdsexcess capital.
Note that the concept of excesscapacity in the proposition is strictly
rooted In the optimizing condition. Excesscapacity is defined as a
negative mean of the difference, E,betweenthe actual marginal reverue
product of capital and its target value, the rental price of capital. It is
not based on any comparison of installedcapacity to actual output.
Increasing retirns to scale
Now consider a firm withincreasing returns. It is easy to show that
equation 1.6, the starting point for the analysis of thispaper, becomes
(1.10)iq =(l+y)uM + yik + 0
.nderincreasing returns. Here ymeasuresthe degree of increasing
returns; 1+y is the elasticity of output with respect to equal proportional
increases in all inputs. y is a variable, not necessarilya constant. k
is the rate of growth of the capital stock.
If we calculate the cost-based productivity residual for thefirm, we
get:
(1.11) =0+y(oM+k)-(1a*)n€
In addition to the composite term related to thesurprise in the shadow
value of capital, there is another term involvingy. Two amendments must
17be made to er.re that the cost-based residual properly measres
productivity growth izxfer irxreaslng returns. First, the cost share, a,
uderstates the actual elasticity of output with respect to labor, which is
actually (I+y) a. Herxe the term yaAn appears on the right. Second, the
rate of growth of capital appears separately with coefficient y.
By assumption, the instrument is positively correlated with En. In
addition, it seems likely that It would be positively correlated with k;
times of rising output are also likely to be times of high investment. On
both acccxnts, the correlation between the cost-based residual and the
instrument will be positive. Hence,
Proposition 4(effectof Increasingretirns):With increasing returns to
scale, the correlation of the cost-based residual and the instrument will be
positive.
A finding of positive correlation could as well be the result of increasing
returns as the result of excess capacity.
2. Econometric method and choice of instrumerts
The invariance proposition tested in this paper is very similar In form
to the one tested in my earlier paper, Hall (1987). The null hypothesis is
refuted by finding a positive correlation between the productivity residual
aix! an exogenous instrument. Econometrically, the simplest way to test
isfor the absence of correlation is to calculate theregression coefficient of
the productivity residual on the instrument anduse the t-test for inference.
To be useful as an instrument, a variable must be thecause of
Important movements in the output and employment of an industry, but not
a cause or an effect of shifts in Its productivity. Here Iuse t.he same
three Instruments as inmy earlier work: the rate of growth of military
spending, the rate of chenge of the price of crude oil, and the political
party of the President. All can be shown to be correlated with theoutput
and employment of at least some of theseven Industries studied here. For
a more extensive defense of their exogeneity withrespect to random
productivity shifts, see my earlier paper.
3.Data and results
Mostof the data used In this study are thesame as described in my
earlier paper (I-Jail (1987)). These include real valueadded,
compensation and total hours of work, and the real capital stock. Theonly
series used here that was rot part of the earlier work Is the rentalprice
of capital.
Construction of the rental price follows Hall andJorgenson (1967).
The formula relating the rentalprice to Its determinants is:
(3.1)r(p +krd
The determinants are:
19p: The firm's real cost of fxxis, measured asthe dividend yield of
the S&P 500 portfolio;
6: The economic rate of deprecIation, 0.127, obtairEd from
Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981), Table 1, p. 179;
k: The effective rate of the investment tax credit, from Jorgenson
and Sullivan, Table 10, p. 194;
d: The present discot.nted value of tax deductions for depreciation,
from Jorgenson and Sullivan, Table 6, pp. 188-189;
r: The statutory corporate tax rate, from Auerbach (1983),
Appendix A;
p:The deflator for business fixed Investment from the U.S.
National Income and Product Accouits.
Use of the dividend yield as the real cost of finds Is justified by two
considerations: First, the great bulk of Investment Is financed through
equity In the form of retained earnings. Second, the use of a market-
determined real rate avoids the very substantial problems of deriving an
estimated real rate by subtracting expected inflation from a nominal rate.
The dividend yield Is a good estimate of the real cost of equity fuxis
wherever the path of future dividends is expected to be proportional to the
price of capital goods. For the typical firm, this Is an eminently
reasonable hypothesis. Of course, for firms with low current dividend
payouts and high expected growth, the dividend yield inderstates the real
cost of fuxfs. But these firms are cotnterbalarxed by mature firms wfxsse
payouts are high and whose growth rates are below the rate of inflation.
204. Results for 7 U.S. frthstries
TableI shows the basic data for nondurablesmanufacturing, one of the
sevenindustries considered. The first column is the rate ofgrowth of
output per iriit of capital; the second is hours growthper uit of capital,
and thethirdcolumn is labor's share In total cost. The cost-based
residual in the fourth column is obtained bymultiplying hours growth by
the labor share and stbtracting the product fromoutput growth. The last
two coiumr show the values of two instr'urnents--the rate ofgrowth of the
price of crude oil and the rate of growth of military spending. There is a
noticeable negative correlation between each of the instruments and the
growth of output, on the one hand, and the cost-based residual, on the
other hand. Oil price lrxreases in 1957, 1973-75, and 1978were
associated with low or negative rates of growth ofoutput and measured
productivity residuals. Oil price declines in 1959, 1963-65, and 1972
were cotçled with high output growth and large measured productivity
residuals. For military spending, increases in 1966-67came at the
same time as low or negative growth rates of output and measured
productivity residuals. Declines in military spending in 1955 and 1971-
73 coincided with high measured productivitygrowth. The evidence based
on military spending is more mixed; for example, In 1954, a large
decline In military spending was associated witha decline in output but
measured productivity growth was only slightly below normal.
The regressions tocarry out formal tests of the invariance of the cost-
21Table 1. Data fornondurables
(p.r-cent chang. or percent)
Cost— Instrum.nt
Output Hours Labor-based Miii—
growthgrowthshare residual Di 1 tary
1953 —1.9 -0.6 78.8 1.6 7.0 —1.7
1954 —4.4 —6.5 80.0 2.0 2.9 —12.3
1955 5.5 2.5 81.2 4.0 0_i —11.8
1956 0.9 —2.5 80.6 2.3 0.5 —1.8
1957 —1.8 —5.2 79.6 1.4 9.7 .0
1958 —4.8 —5.2 80.0 3.0 0.2 —1.9
1959 3.9 4.5 81.5 5.0 —3.4 —1.6
1960 0.8 —2.0 81.3 0.7 0.4 -0.2
1961 —0.3 —2.8 81.9 2.5 —0.7 2.6
1962 2.2 —0.1 82.9 3.3 0.2 0.5
1963 2.9 —2.5 83.2 7.1 —0.4 —0.9
1964 2.1 —2.4 83.7 3.2 —0.4 —4.0
1965 3.7 —3.2 83.4 1.9 —0.1 —0.2
1966 3.2 —4.2 82.1 1.2 0.7 13.2
1967 —1.5 —5.8 81.8 —1.8 1.1 12.3
1968 2.9 —3.1 81.9 3.4 0.8 1.7
1969 —0.1 —3.4 80.2 2.0 4.3 —6.0
1970 —1.9 —7.8 78.1 1.2 0.9 —9.1
1971 —0.4 —5.0 79.3 5.2 7.7 —8.4
1972 .5 —0.9 80.1 5.5 —0.7 —7.3
1973 0.7 —0.9 79.6 7.3 10.2 —7.8
1974 —2.9 —7.4 76.8 —3.3 51.9 —4.6
1975 —0.9 —10.7 75.5 0.7 14.8 —3.0
1976 2.3 0.8 76.9 2.9 3.2 —2.7
1977 2.4 —2.0 76.0 2.0 7.8 1.3
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In both cases, the correlation of the Instrumentwith output growth is
negative, so the evidence Is inamblguous that an event sixh asan oil price
decline or cut In military spending, which stimulatesnondurables sales,
raises the cost-based measure ofprodictlvlty. The failure of the
theoretical invarianceproperty is attributable to some failure of its
urxlerlying asswnpuons. My interpretation is that either theassu-nptlon
of optimal Investment or theassumption of constant returns to scale
fails. I will return later to a fuller discussion of theImplications of the
rejection of the invariance proposition.
Tables 2 and 3 present the evidence for allseven industries and for the
oil, military, and political Instruments. The entries in Table 2are the
marginal significance levels for the 21 tests for invariance. Thatis, each
number Is the probability that a covarlance at leastas positive as the one
actually farxl might have arisen purely by chance. All Industriesexcept
services reject the invariance hypothesis at the 10percent level and all
except services and flnanoe-insurarce-real estate reject at the 5percent
23Table 2. Test statistics for 7 industries and 3 instruments.
Military







Trans. and utilities 0.015 0.271 0.029
Notes:
Thestatistics are the marginal significance lvel fora one—tailed
test of thehypothesis that the covariance of the cost—based residual
andtheinstrument is positive. The sign of the instrument is
normalized so that its covariarice with output growth is positive.Table 3.Results for 7 industries and 3 instruments.
Coefficient,standard error,andDurbin—Watsonstatisticfor each
regression
































































2.33level. The oil price is a factor price and a source of demand shifts for
each of the 7 lrxkstrles. On the assumption that neither role should shift
the production ftlon, that Is, that oil price fluctuetlons are uncorrelated
with true productivity growth, I conclude that Invariance fails in the
direction predicted by excess capacity or Increasing returns to scale.
In two Industries, services and norxlurables, fluctuations in military
spending show evidence of failure of the invariance hypothesis in the
direction predicted by excess capacity or increasing returns. All
industries except durables show some evidence of failure in that direction.
The political party of the President is suitable as an Instrument to the
extent that the differences In policies of the two parties create differences
in output growth rates but not in true productivity growth. In fact, real
growth has generally been greater under Democrats that under
Republicans. Under the assumption that the growth was achieved through
differences in monetary and fiscal policy and not through differences in
policies affecting the production function, the political dummy is a good
instrument. I consider this assumption eminently reasonable. The third
column of Table 2 shows that the political dummy gives strong rejection
of Invariance for services and transportation-utilities and somevkiat
weaker rejection for durables. Results for other industries are
Indeterminate mainly because output growth has hardly been different
tzxler the two parties.
265. Irterpretatian & rejection oflnvwionce & thecost-based prodictlvity
reslth.aal
As a matter of theory, anoptimizing firm with a constant returns
tethiology should obey invar1are—its cost-based productivitymeasure
should be uorDelated withany outside force that changes output but does
nct change its production f.rction. I have shown earlier thatexcess
capacity or increasing returns to scale could explain the failure of
invariance in the direction fouid here. With chronicexcess capacity, the
firm's costs would be higher thanappropriate, so the cost share of labor
would uxierstate the trus elasticity ofoutput with respect to labor input.
Similarly, fixed costs or other failures of constant returns would make the
cost share uxierstate the true elasticity. Then, asa result of the
ivxlerstatement of the elasticity, the cost-basedproductivity residual would
incorporate too small an adjustment for variations in labor input and the
residual itself would riseevery time output rose.
Other conditions could cause the failure of Invariance. Theseinclude
i.rimeasured fluctuations in work effort, suboptimal levels ofemployment
because of monopsonypower in the labor market, u-irneasured fluctuations
in capital utilization, and mis-measurement of laborInput.
Labor howding
Before considering the various specificationerrors in turn, I should
discuss or major phemmenon that has animportant role in the story told
27by the data but is notanalternative explanation of the findings. I refer to
labor hoarding and overhead labor. The following example shows how the
invariance property of the cost-based residual holds in the presence of
overhead labor:
Suppose that the technology is such that the level of employment
required to produce art output QisXK + 4[Q- K]+.That is, with a capital
stock of K and overhead labor of XK, it is possible to produce up to K units
of output. Additional output requires an Increment of 4' units of labor for
each irtit of output above K. The shadow value of capital is -Xw when
output is below K because the firm could produce just as much output with
lower overhead labor if its capital were lower. The shadow value of
capital is (4' -A)wwhen QexceedsK--In that regime, more capital
requires more overhead workers but reduces the requirement for the
incremental labor described byLet be the probability that output will
exceed K. Then the expected shadow value of capital is (p4' -X)w.At the
optimum capital stock, this equals the service price of capital, r. Hence,
=(r+Aw)/4'w.Suppose that the fluctuations in output are in a small
region above arid below K. The cost share, o,willbe close to
wA/(wX+r). Because there is no true productivity change, the actual
change in output, iq, Is a valid instrument itself. Suppose that the capital
stock does not change over time. When output is below K, the change in
employment is zero and the cost-based residual is equal to q. Thus the
relation between the residual arid the instrument has a unit slope. When
output is above K, the change in employment, tN, is 4'Q.Thelevel of
employment is close to XQ, because 0 is only a little over K. Hence the
rate of growth of employment, M, is approximately (4'/X)q. The slope
of the relation between the cost-based residual iq -o*nand iq is
28(kimeas&red fluctuations in work effort
Ofthe various specification errors that may have biased the covariance
of the cost-based residual and an lrstrurnent L.çward, the only one that
seems to have the potential to reverse the negative conclusion about
Investment theory with constant returns is the following, considered at
length in the earlier paper: There are unmeasured variations in work
effort that are positively correlated with output. When an outside force
drives up output and employment, measured productivity rises for a reason
unrelated to increasing returns or excess capacity. There is rc question
that the metlxxl of this paper is vulnerable to such measurement errors;
the only question is the numerical importance of the errors.
A number of conslderatiors convince me that unmeasured fluctuations
in effort cannot explain all of the correlation I find between the cost-based
residual and various instruments. First, the magnitude of the fluctuations
would have to be large. Figure 2 of my earlierpaper skws that the
effort of the typical worker would have to have been almost 10 percent
above normal for a sustained period in the 1960s, for example. Second,
survey evidence collected from employers by Fay and Medoff (1985)
suggests that effort Is slightly negatively correlated with output, not
strongly positively, as required to give an upward bias In the estimated
mark ratio. Third, the fluctuations in effort needed to rationalize the
observed fluctuations in productivity are inconsistent with the observed
behavior of compensation. Work effort rises so much in a boom that the
wage, corrected for changes In effort, actually falls. I find this
implausible. The only way to rescue the hypothesis of large fluctuations
30I -a/X.The average slope is 1- + (I -<y*/X).Irertlng the
values for and c,*derivedabove shows that the average slope is zero.
In the example, It Is true that when the firm Is In the labor-hoarding
regime, when Qisbelow K, the covariarxe of the cost-based residual and
the lrstrumerit would be stronglypositive.However, this is exactly
coLnterbalancedby a nagative covarlance when output Is above K. What if
a firm spent most of its time In the labor-hoarding regime and had output
above K only in times of extreme demand? Isn't this the normal case for
most finns? The arswer Is that such a firm is not satisfying the
condition for optimal investment; it has excess capacity. If It is the
normal condition, It simply proves the point of thispaper, that the
evidence suggests that excess capacity or fixed costs are Important.
Labor hoarding and overhead labor are probably Important phenomena in
a number, If not all, of the lndttrles studied in this paper. When a firm
is In a labor-hoarding regime, Its cost-based residual will be positively
correlated with an instrn'nent. In that respect, labor hoarding is an
essential part of the explanation of the findings of thispaper. However,
labor hoarding Is not an alteimative explanation to excess capacity or
increasing returns for the failure of the invariance property of the cost-
based residual. A firm with a cortant ret tecfulogy and an optimal
Investment strategy, no matter how ridden with forecasting errors, will
spend enough time In a labor-shortage regime to offset the time spent in
the labor-hoarding regime. As the example shows, the condition for
optimal investment amotrts to stating that the two regimes combir in
such a way as to eliminate any covarlance of the cost-based residual with
an Instr,jrnent.
29in work effort Is to Invoke the theory ofwage smoothing, in which
workers are not paid on a current basis for their laborinput, but rather
receive comperation based on the average level of work over an extended
period.
Other labor issues
A basic maintained hypothesis of thispaper is that the firm chooses an
optimal level of employment. The derivation of equation 1.6 makes the
assunption that the marginal reverue product of labor is equated to the
wage. An alternative Is that the firm employs too many workers, on the
average. Then the measured elasticity, u*, would exceed the true
elastIcity, o, because the observed wage would overstate the shadow value
of labor. Herxe the covarlarce of the measured cost-basedproductivity
residual with an 1rtrument would be negative. Excess labor could not
explain the findings of the paper.
By the same token, If the shadow value of labor exceeds the observed
wage most of the time, the findings could be explained. For example, if
the typical firm has strongmonopsony power in its labor market, a
failure of the invarlarxe property would occur In the observed direction.
But the conditlone trxler which this could be expected topersist for long
periods are streruots. First, If there is bilateral bargaining with a labor
t.rdon, one would not expect to find a shadow value of labor in excess of the
observed wage. Both parties could be made better off byattracting a
worker from the open market and paying the worker the prevailing union
wage. And if the union has much morxpoly power, It is likely to succeed
in pushing the observed wage above the shadow value, byextracting a kniip-
31sum component of comperation as part of an efficient bargain.
Second, the firm has a strong irxentive to overcome its monopsony
position in the labor market by attracting workers from more distant
markets. That is, when it can only get more work from its own local
market by driving ieveryworker's wage, it will turn to other markets.
What matters is the elasticity of labor stply from the entire labor
market to the one firm in the long rtn. It is hard to believe that this
elasticity is anything less than a very large number for most firms.
Mlsmeastrernent & capital
An important implicit assumption of my work is that capital input is
correctly measured. The measure of capital I use is the amouit of capital
available for use. As long as capital has no pure user cost, it is
reasonable to assume that all capital available is in use. If there Is a
pure user cost--If capital depreciates in use rather than just over time--
then the situation is different. There is a capital sLçply decision similar
to the labor st.ply decision and presumably fluctuations In capital input
occur in parallel to fluctuations in output. I should note at the outset that
if capital is out of use because it is redundant--its shadow value is zero--
then there is no bias in my procedure. The dangerous case is when capital
has a positive shadow value and there are uimeasured fluctuations in
utilization.
Though it is not possible to dispose of this hypothesis as a complete or
partial explanation of the failure of invariance, it is possible to show that
it calls for rather extreme movements of the true capital stock,
corresponding to substantial pure user costs of capital. Let v be the
32change In measurement error of capital actually in use. Then the true
relation between q and An, when these are calculated with measured
rather than actual capital, will be:
(5.1) Aq=uM-(1-cT)Av+O
Suppose that the measurement errors are related to the change In
employment, as they would be if they arose from rmeasured fluctuations
in capital utilization:
(5.2) =-4)An
Strict complementarity of work hours and capital hours wouldmean that 4)
has the value of one.
In this setup, the cost-based residual Is
(5.3)
The variable (I -cr)Ancan be formed (using cr in place of a, which only
adds an innocuousterm)and then the parameter 4) can be estimated by
instrumental variables.




Irtrurnent: Change In oil price
- = .025+4.97(1 -
(.005)(3.19)
DW: 2.02SE: .028
Irtrurnent: Change in military spending
In effect, these estimates interpret the observed correlation of the
irtrurnents with the cost-based productivity residual as arising from
measurement errors in capital utilization. In order to explain the
magnitirie of the correlation, the elasticities of the measirement errors
with respect to the change in labor Input must be implausibly large--aroud
2.5 or 5. The simple model In which capital and labor fluctuate in
proportion, In which Is one, Is rt nearly emugh to explain the findings
of the paper.
346. Conclusion
The data strorlyrefutethe combination of two hypotheses: Constant
returnstoscaleanda capital stock that maximizes expected profit.
Takenatfacevalue,the findings precludethedevelopment of' a structural
investment equation along conventional lines. SinceJorgenson, the
centerpiece of investment equations has been profit-maximizing cfxice of
the capital stock by the firm. But thathypothesis requires the recognition
of sthstantial departures from constant returns toscale, in the direction
of increasing returns. Investment theory then must enter the thicketof
Industry equilibrium with fixed costs or other sources ofincreasing
returns. No simple relation between output, the rentalprice of capital,
and the capital stock can be expected to describe the behavior of
Investment. For example, output and the capital stock willexpand in
proportion if the expansion Is accompanfied by a proportional expansion in
the number of productive zdts, so that the scale of eachunit remains
tnchanged. Capital will grow less than in proportion tooutput if the
number of tziits remains tiichanged and each achievesa greater scale.
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